The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) recently drew flak after DTI Secretary Ma. Cristina Aldeguer-Roque claims that a 500-peso meal package will suffice for an “ordinary” family of four for Noche Buena (see Clapano 2025). It did not help when the Malacañang defended the DTI (see Macairan and Romero 2025). This commenced a series of discourses among solons and even celebrities. Mariel Padilla, an actress and the wife of Senator Robin Padilla, joined the 500-peso Noche Buena challenge, concluding that the budget is technically possible but with the caveat that “Filipinos deserve more” (Del Callar 2025). On the contrary, the actress Katrina Halili exceeded a little over a hundred when she attempted her best to squeeze in the 500-peso budget when shopping (Santiago 2025).
Regardless, an overwhelming number of Filipinos have expressed indignation over such “insensitivity.” It is ironic, many commenters on social media remark, that these officials will never prefer to have a 500-peso Noche Buena for themselves, as much as they will never want to opt for public transportation or any public services that they enact and oversee on behalf of the Filipino people. But what exactly is insulting or off about it? Is it only because it is insensitive? Is it that it hurts to realize that many Filipino families, in fact, will have to stretch 500 pesos for the most festive evening of the year, while these officials will never worry about such matters? Is it because it is ironic that those who will never experience budgeting a 500-peso Noche Buena are the ones telling about it to the rest?
It is more than these, I argue. To put it briefly, this discourse reveals the genesis of wants. It exposes how our wants are lowballed to prevent critiquing the very origins of such lowballing, namely, social and political problems in the country and the world.
You Wouldn’t Want Sour Grapes Anyway
In defense of her remark, Secretary Aldeguer-Roque says, “Not everybody wants to celebrate ostentatiously” (Clapano 2025). After all, if you are financially struggling, why would you even want an extravagant menu worth over 500 pesos? But do you really know what you want? Do those who have less means to celebrate “ostentatiously” really not prefer to be festive at the most festive time of the year?
The philosopher Jon Elster, in his seminal essay “Sour Grapes — Utilitarianisms and the Genesis of Wants,” brings our attention to an old fable, entitled “The Fox and the Bunch of Grapes,” attributed to Aesop (Babrius 1961, 19):
Upon a mountain side’s incline In clusters on a blackened vine Hung grapes. The fox, that wily beast, Observed their fullness now increased, And thought to leap from tip of toe, And grasp the fresh fruit from below, For they were ripe for harvesting.But he grew tired in vain, his spring Not strong enough to reach so high.He salved his grief while going by: “Just as I thought before I’d seen; Those grapes aren’t ripe at all, but green!”
The fox wants the grapes. For some time, he toiled to pick them. Alas, he cannot reach them. Then he walks away, pretending he did not want them in the first place. He justifies, “Those grapes aren’t ripe at all, but green!” Because they are unripe, these grapes are sour. And who wants disgustingly sour grapes? However, the last line is the very hole to his self-deception. Green grapes are not necessarily unripe. Some varieties remain green when ripe and sweet. Moreover, the fable recognizes that the grapes, albeit green, are ripe for harvesting. But because of what Elster calls the “sour grapes” phenomenon, the fox just supposes it must be sour.
What exactly is this sour grapes phenomenon? Elster (1999, 219–226) also calls it “adaptive preference formation.” This occurs when the agent limits one’s set of feasible preferences according to circumstances that causally affect oneself. Limitation implies that the agent originally and really desires something. But because of constraining circumstances that happen to oneself (the vines are out of reach), one excludes that which one originally and really wants (the grapes). However, to also ease oneself, the agent unconsciously dispels what is originally and really wanted (the grapes) and acts as if his adaptive preferences (the set of feasible preferences after being limited by the adaptive preference formation, i.e., the one that now excludes what he originally and really wanted) are what he really wants. That is, the grapes are unripe and sour anyway, and so I do not really want them.
You may think of other examples. Suppose you want a new leather bag. But because it is unavailable or you do not have enough money, you may just think, “Well, genuine leather bags are cruel anyway! I’m just going to buy the cheaper and readily available faux leather option.” But beyond such superficial examples, I hope the reader is now seeing how this connects to the issue at hand. For many, what causally constrain their set of feasible preferences are poverty and social injustices alike. And so I ask again, “Do those who have less means to celebrate ‘ostentatiously’ really not prefer to be festive at the most festive time of the year?”
Elster originally meant to propose this as a critique against the preferentialist theory of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, a normative ethical theory, is comprised of two theories that complete it. Its theory of right actions or means is consequentialism. Now, the consequentialist right means must aim for the good end (i.e., to arrive at the good end, you must do what is consequential in bringing it about, hence consequentialism). But what is this good end? The utilitarian theory of the good end is welfarism. That is, an ethical person must do the right actions to achieve welfare. But what is welfare? There are several theories of welfare, but one of them, and especially one of the most prominent today, is preferentialism. It argues that we ought to fulfill the preferences, wants, interests, or desires of people or moral agents. The more they are fulfilled, the more the welfare increases, and the more we arrive at the fulfillment of morality’s good end.
This is why Aesop’s fable is impactful. It gives an instance when the preference or want of its moral agent, the fox, is questionable. It is questionable because the genesis or origin of it is questionable. And if preferences are questionable, then the whole moral mechanism that counts the fulfilment of such preferences as good is also put into question. Simply put, we must not be ignorant of the genesis of wants. To observe what people plainly want is naive, for what may appear they want or do not want are really just adaptive preferences.
Preference Lowballing
Elster’s essay was published as a chapter in an anthology entitled “Utilitarianism and Beyond.” While a philosophical work, it also interestingly reads like an anthology for economics, public policy, and the like, beyond philosophy. This is because utilitarianism has long been influential in such fields. It seems commonsensical that we must maximize our limited resources through a pattern of distribution that maximizes the fulfillment of preferences for the many. And this is why Elster’s critique is important. Do those in control of such economic distributions really know what the people really want?
In this section, I now extend Elster’s observation. Whereas Elster focuses on the agent as an individual who undergoes adaptive preference formation, I now go to the very source of adaptive preference formation. What are these causal circumstances that influence one to limit one’s set of feasible preferences? And what is the mechanism by which other people, especially the powers that be, employ so that agents with adaptive preferences do not realize that, so to speak, they really want the grapes?
As previously suggested, in many cases, these “causal circumstances” are poverty and other social injustices that afflict the agent. It is the equivalent of being unable to reach the vines in Aesop’s fable. This should not be difficult to understand. Many Filipinos are too familiar with personal stories when one has to abandon a desired dream due to poverty, sexism, colorism, and the like. And so, they settle for less. Through adaptive preference formation, however, they unconsciously believe that they do not really desire what they really dream. Such dreams are thought of as being too wild and unrealistic, such that they cannot possibly be counted in one’s set of feasible preferences. “It is not for me,” they say. Consequently, they settle for “less.” And the “less” is not treated less, but “appropriate” to one’s social standing. Meanwhile, what is originally desired is designated as “too great” to be even considered considerable.
Now, what about Secretary Aldeguer-Roque and the likes? What part do they play? Evidently, they are not the agent who undergoes adaptive preference formation. Nonetheless, they employ, may it be wittingly or unwittingly, the mechanism I call “preference lowballing.” You can say that adaptive preference formation is a kind of preference lowballing applied to oneself. The preference lowballing that I am now talking about, on the other hand, is not applied to oneself but to others who are especially afflicted with causal circumstances.
Before proceeding, I should note that adaptive preference formation is originally distinguished from “deliberate manipulation” (Elster 1999, 223–224), and my discussion of preference lowballing may sound similar to it (although preference lowballing need not be fully consciously done). Deliberate manipulation happens when an agent manipulates what others may prefer, causing them to form adaptive preferences. For instance, a cruel king may deliberately forbid education to his people so that they will not even desire ousting him. On the other hand, adaptive preference formation merely focuses on oneself. That is why the causal circumstance that befalls the fox in Aesop’s fable is the fox’s own inability to reach the vine. It is not caused by others. Nevertheless, it is obvious in the context of social injustices how Elster’s original articulation can be extended to include cases when causal circumstances are not like the fox’s own inability to reach the vine. Causal circumstances like poverty are not merely about the impoverished. They are systemic, which includes a network of agents beyond the impoverished. And it is in this network of agents where I locate the ones who employ, wittingly or not, preference lowballing.
Essentially, the DTI’s remark that a 500-peso Noche Buena is enough is a great example of an attempt at preference lowballing. It lowballs what an agent may prefer. It normalizes the agent’s adaptive preferences (e.g., a 500-peso worth of Noche Buena for a family of four), and thus further buries the original preferences (that even an impoverished family may dare to desire, among others, a whole hamon). In doing so, preference lowballing also further conceals the causal circumstances that cause the agent to undergo adaptive preference formation. Because a 500-peso Noche Buena is normalized and deemed appropriate, while exceeding it is to be “ostentatious,” the agent is preemptively prevented from reflecting the genesis of one’s wants. Because of that, they are barred from realizing that if not, for instance, for poverty, they could have wanted more. Realizing so can be a catalyst for radical change.
In effect, preference lowballing also normalizes the casual circumstances that afflict us. It forestalls the critique of such social and political issues. Therefore, apart from the limitation of feasible preferences in adaptive preference formation, preference lowballing similarly limits the feasible calls for change, likewise, lowballing our expectations of the government. Rather than rattling the gates of Malacañang, we are the ones being rattled by their proposal to adapt our preferences according to societal ills, like poverty, instead of dissolving these very causes of our adaptive preferences. Unsurprisingly, a great source of poverty can be traced back to the same powers that be that deploy preference lowballing. Thus, preference lowballing is a deceptive cycle. This is what disgusts and exasperates us.
Nobody Wants Sour Grapes for Christmas
What is great in what has transpired, however, is that DTI’s attempt at preference lowballing in this instance is unsuccessful. Too many people rightfully criticize them. Perhaps this is in light of the Christmas spirit.
The essence of Christmas is the opposite of preference lowballing. Many people interject that Noche Buena, being the highlight of the festive day, cannot be reduced to an “ordinary” meal as one would usually have daily, where a 500-peso budget may suffice. Even people who lack means will go to great lengths just to have an “ostentatious” dinner table. After all, for the faithful, the birth of Christ being celebrated symbolizes that we are offered radically beyond what we imaginably desire.
The problem, however, is whether we can maintain the same keen eyesight when Christmas lights turn off.
Babrius. 1961. Aesop’s Fables. Translated by Denison B. Hull. The University of Chicago Press.
Clapano, Jose Rodel. 2025. “Lawmakers Hit P500 Noche Buena.” One News, November 29. https://www.onenews.ph/articles/lawmakers-hit-p500-noche-buena?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQPNDM3NjI2MzE2OTczNzg4AAEeeW9v0IrvXEiA58pLcbWmRCXOqnTmRdQ80HhtyIQ_F2_rfM3lcdh0zcIuZAE_aem_J3A9iC45OELxMbpQ5fGZGQ.
Del Callar. 2025. “Mariel Padilla Takes on ₱500 Noche Buena challenge.” News 5. December 8. https://news.tv5.com.ph/breaking/read/mariel-padilla-takes-on-%E2%82%B1500-noche-buena-challenge.
Elster, Jon. 1999. “Sour Grapes — Utilitarianisms and the Genesis of Wants.” In Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams. Cambridge University Press.
Macairan, Evelyn, and Alexis Romero. 2025. “Palace Stands by DTI’s P500 Noche Buena Budget.” Philstar Global. December 2. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/12/02/2491261/palace-stands-dtis-p500-noche-buena-budget.
Santiago, Ervin. 2025. “Katrina Halili Kumasa sa P500 Noche Buena Challenge: Nawindang sa Cashier!” Bandera. December 4. https://bandera.inquirer.net/433610/katrina-halili-kumasa-sa-p500-noche-buena-challenge-nawindang-sa-cashier.